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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
In the present case, the court adhered to the general well estab-
lished rule concerning an adverse agency relationship. The plaintiff
knew that the union was acting as agent for both the plants and
voiced its dissent to the strike so as to repudiate the action of the
union. Thus, it would be unjust to hold the plaintiff bound to the
acts of the union, for although the plaintiff did have full knowledge,
he did not freely consent to, or ratify the acts of the agent union.
CHARITABLE SUBSCRIPTIONS - ENFORCEMENT - GROWTH OF
PRoMIssORY ESTOPPEL.-The St. Marks Church, the plaintiff, desir-
ing to build a new edifice, found that its funds were insufficient to
meet the plans as drawn. The testator agreed to subscribe $25,000
if the church would approve the plans without modification and ob-
tain a loan of $60,000 on a mortgage arranged by the testator. The
church complied. The subscription was conditioned for cancellation
upon written notice of change in the subscriber's financial condition,
and ". .. that it shall not be considered binding upon my estate."
The church commenced this action upon the agreement when the
executor resisted the claim for the balance. Held, the agreement
bound the estate. The testator knew that his subscription was the
factor that induced the adoption of the plans without modification.
The court stated that ". . . it must be held that Mr. Atwater had no
desire or intention of limiting his pledge. There is no question that
the defendant is well able to pay the sum in dispute, and its conten-
tions, I am sure do not reflect the thoughts of its testate." Rector,
Church Wardens, Vestrymen St. Marks Church, Westhampton
Beach v. Bankers Trust Co., 197 Misc. 32, 96 N. Y. S. 2d 554
(Sup. Ct. 1949).
A subscription is a written agreement to furnish a designated
sum of money or its equivalent for a particular purpose.' A "chari-
table subscription" is in essence a promise to make a gift,2 a promise
not supported by consideration. 3 Notwithstanding the absence of
consideration, the need for enforcing such agreements was recognized
as early as 1828.4 The resulting decisions ". . . indicate the presence
interests and both principals, having full knowledge of all the facts, give their
free consent to the agency. Bell v. McConnell, 37 Ohio St 396 (1881).
' BouviE's LAW DICTIONARY 3171 (8th ed., Rawle, 1914); BLACK'S LAw
DICTIONARY 1117 (3d ed. 1933).
25Twenty-third St. Baptist Church v. Cornell, 117 N. Y. 601, 23 N. E. 177(1890).
3 "The very term 'charitable subscription' indicates that the subscriber's
promise is made as a gift and not in return for consideration." 1 WmiUsToN,
CoNnUCTs § 116 (revised ed., Thompson, 1936).
4 "It cannot be maintained that objects so important shall be frustrated
.. . by the rights of individuals to withdraw their contributions or refuse to
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of three different rationes decidendi for the attainment of this result,
the first being the spelling out of an ordinary bilateral contract;
second, the completion of a contract that was initially unilateral; and
third, the invocation of an approximation of the equitable doctrine of
estoppel." 5
To find the consideration needed for a bilateral contract courts
since 1854 have allowed the introduction of parol evidence to show
the circumstances surrounding the agreement. 6 The consideration
is the mutual promises of the parties, the subscriber to pay and the
institution to perform certain services or acts. The return promise
of the institution is implied 7 from the acceptance of the subscription
which imports a promise to apply the funds for the purpose described
in the subscription.8
The second ratio decidendi, a completed unilateral contract, finds
the subscription to be an offer for a unilateral contract which becomes
binding when acted upon by the promisee.9 By incurring liability in
furtherance of the project, the promisee is deemed to have accepted
the offer.10 It would appear that the offer, if an offer at all, would
call for the completion of the act, i.e., the purpose given in the sub-
scription. However, the bona fide partial performance doctrine of
the Restatement has strengthened the reasoning of the unilateral con-
tract theory."
The third ratio decidendi, the invocation of the estoppel doc-
trine,12 has been held to be applicable only when a bilateral or com-
comply with their promises, after the execution or during the progress of the
work which they themselves set in motion." Amherst Academy v. Cowls, 23
Mass. 427, 433 (1828); accord, Barnes v. Perine, 15 Barb. 249 (1852), aff'd,
12 N. Y. 18 (1854).
5 Matter of Lord, 175 Misc. 921, 923, 25 N. Y. S. 2d 747, 749 (Surr. Ct.
1941).
6 . & I. Holding Co. v. Gainsburg, 276 N. Y. 427, 12 N. E. 2d 532 (1938);
Keuka College v. Ray, 167 N. Y. 96, 60 N. E. 325 (1901) ; Presbyterian Church
of Albany v. Cooper, 112 N. Y. 517, 20 N. E. 352 (1889); Barnes v. Perine,
15 Barb. 249 (1852), aff'd, 12 N. Y. 18 (1854).
7 Allegheny College v. Nat. Chautauqua Co. Bank, 246 N. Y. 369, 159 N. E.
173 (1927) ; Keuka College v. Ray, supra note 6; Tioga County General Hos-
pital v. Tidd, 164 Misc. 273, 298 N. Y. Supp. 460 (Sup. Ct. 1937); Wash.
Heights M. E. Church v. Comfort, 138 Misc. 236, 246 N. Y. Supp. 450 (N. Y.
Munic. Ct. 1930); Central Maine General Hospital v. Carter, 125 Me. 191,
132 Atl. 417 (1926).8 Allegheny College v. Nat. Chautauqua Co. Bank, supra note 7; Barnes
v. Perine, 15 Barb. 249 (1852), aff'd, 12 N. Y. 18 (1854); Matter of Lord,
175 Misc. 921, 25 N. Y. S. 2d 747 (Surr. Ct. 1941); Wash. Heights M. E.
Church v. Comfort, supra note 7.
9 I. & I. Holding Co. v. Gainsburg, 276 N. Y. 427, 12 N. E. 2d 532 (1938).
10 1. & I. Holding Co., supra note 9; Matter of Metz, 262 App. Div 508
30 N. Y. S. 2d 502 (1st Dep't 1941); Matter of Lord, 175 Misc. 921, 25
N. Y. S. 2d 747 (Surr. Ct. 1941); R-STATEMNT, CONTRACTS § 45 (1932).11 RESTATEENT, CONTRACTS § 45 (1932).
12 "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action
or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the
promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if in-
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pleted unilateral contract cannot be found.'3 Some courts, however,
have predicated their decisions squarely upon both consideration and
estoppel. 4 The first and second rationes decidendi have been utilized
in cases where all the elements of estoppel were present; nevertheless,
lip service was paid to contract principles. 15 It would appear, there-
fore, that unless these elements of estoppel are present there can be
no enforcement.
The court in the instant case used no ratio decidendi by name
but based its decision squarely upon the elements of estoppel.16 This
decision may well establish a precedent for the enforcement of char-
itable subscriptions solely on the grounds of estoppel.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-ADmIssION OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY
ILLEGAL SEARCH AND' SEIZURE. - Appellant and another were con-
victed of conspiracy to commit abortion. The conviction was upheld
in the State Supreme Court although evidence was obtained by
means of an illegal search and seizure.' Appellant alleges that the
admission of this evidence was a violation of the "due process clause"
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Held, conviction sustained. The "due process clause" of the Four-
teenth Amendment does not prohibit admission of illegally obtained
evidence in state courts. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949).2
justice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." RE-STATEMENT,
CONTRACTS § 90 (1932) ; Beatty v. Western College, 177 Ill. 280, 52 N. E. 432
(1898); Simpson Centenary College v. Tuttle, 71 Iowa 596, 33 N. W. 74(1887).
13 1. & I. Holding Co. v. Gainsburg, 276 N. Y. 427, 12 N. E. 2d 532 (1938).
14 Matter of Lord, 175 Misc. 921, 25 N. Y. S. 2d 747 (Surr. Ct. 1941);
First M. E. Church of Mt. Vernon v. Howard, 133 Misc. 723, 233 N. Y. Supp.
451 (Surr. Ct. 1929), af'd zthout opinion, 233 App. Div. 753, 250 N. Y.
Supp. 906 (2d Dep't 1931).
151. & I. Holding Co. v. Gainsburg, 276 N. Y. 427, 12 N. E. 2d 532 (1938);
Allegheny College v. Nat. Chautauqua Co. Bank, 246 N. Y. 369, 159 N. E.
173 (1927) ; Keuka College v. Ray, 167 N. Y. 96, 60 N. E. 325 (1901) ; Barnes
v. Perine, 15 Barb. 249 (1852), aff'd, 12 N. Y. 18 (1854); Central Maine
General Hospital v. Carter, 125 Me. 191, 132 Atl. 417 (1926).
16 RFSTATEMENT, CONTRACrS § 90 (1932). In the instant case utilization
-of either the first or second ratio decidendi would have effected a new and
different agreement due to the presence of negative clause in the subscription.
1 Wolf et al. v. People, 117 Colo. 279, 187 P. 2d 926 (1947).
2But cf. Lustig v. United States, 338 U. S. 74 (1949), decided by the
Supreme Court the same day. There state officials secured a warrant for arrest
of petitioner, charging him with violation of a city ordinance requiring all
known criminals to register with the police. When admitted to the suspect's
rooms, they embarked on an illegal search. Uncovering evidence of counter-
feiting, they called in a federal agent, who there and then examined the evi-
dence although he did not participate in the search. Petitioner was convicted
of counterfeiting. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction ruling that ad-
[ VOL. 25
